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THE PRIVATIZATION OF RELIGION AND
CATHOLIC JUSTICES
RICHARD S. MYERSt
The privatization of religion has been a major theme in
American law and culture over the last several decades.' There
have been increasing pressures to marginalize religion. 2 A recent
noteworthy example has been the attacks on the Catholic
Justices of the United States Supreme Court.3 One commentator
suggested that the presence of five Catholic Justices on the Court
itself violates the Constitution.4 There have been, in addition,
t Richard S. Myers, Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. This Paper is a
revised version of a talk that was given on October 27, 2007, at the Fifteenth Annual
Society of Catholic Social Scientists Meeting at St. John's University School of Law.
1 See Richard S. Myers, The Ten Commandments Cases and the Future of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 11 CATH. SOC. Sci. REV. 245, 250-53
(2006) [hereinafter Myers, The Ten Commandments Cases]; Richard S. Myers, The
Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 19 (1991)
[hereinafter Myers, Privatization of Religion]; Richard S. Myers, The United States
Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion, 6 CATH. SOC. SCI. REV. 223 (2001)
[hereinafter Myers, The United States Supreme Court]; see also STEPHEN L. CARTER,
CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How LAW AND POLITIcS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 3
(1993) ("Contemporary American politics faces few greater dilemmas than deciding
how to deal with the resurgence of religious belief.... [W]e have created a political
and legal culture that presses the religiously faithful to be other than themselves, to
act publicly, and sometimes privately as well, as though their faith does not matter
to them."); Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization
of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771, 779-80 (2001) (noting that both the belief that
religion should be part of the public sphere and the attitude that religion should
"stay out of politics" are "deeply rooted" in American traditions); Steven G. Gey,
Rewriting the Establishment Clause for One Nation Under (a) God, 41 TULSA L. REV.
737, 747-48 (2006) (discussing the continuing debate over "the principle that
government should be completely a purely secular institution and religion should be
an entirely private affair").
2 See, e.g., Matthew A. Ritter, Constitutional Jurisprudence of Law and
Religion: Privacy v. Piety-Has the Supreme Court Petered Out?, 40 CATH. LAW. 323,
326 (2001) ("Secularism... marginalizes religion, banishing it to the purely private
sphere, from which private sphere it exerts no moral claim upon the public sphere
and thus poses little subversive harm to the civic order.").3 See Alan Cooperman, Court Could Tip to Catholic Majority: Some Say Slant Is
Dangerous; Others See Historic Victory, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2005, at A03.
4 Michael J. Gerhardt, Why the Catholic Majority on the Supreme Court May Be
Unconstitutional, U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 173, 174 (2006). Gerhardt argues that
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many attacks on the Catholic Justices after the Court's April
2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart.5 In that case, the five
Catholic Justices constituted the majority that upheld the
constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003.6 In
this Paper, I will discuss and critique these developments and
offer some reflections on the proper role of religion in shaping the
culture and the law.
First, I will begin with some of the legal background. The
privatization of religion has been an important theme in
Supreme Court cases and in legal commentary for several
decades now. For a time, the Court seemed committed to
privatizing religion. The Court's decisions have improved
somewhat in recent years, but the situation is still highly
unstable. This instability is due, in part, to the cultural
pressures I will note below.
There is much bad news here. There are plenty of examples
of decisions and opinions of individual Justices that reflect a
hostility to a public role for religion. 7 I think, though, that the
general trend in religion clause cases over the last twenty-five
years has been positive. In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court's
decisions were contributing greatly to the privatization of
Republican presidents intentionally appointed Catholic Justices since the Justices
could be expected to "rigidly adhere to their ideological preferences," and thus
produce consistently conservative rulings. Gerhardt believes this preference of
ideology over law and precedent violates the rule of law. Also, the selection process
for the Catholic Justices may have violated Article VI's prohibition of religious tests
for federal office, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. Id.
5 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); see Geoffrey R. Stone, Our Faith-Based Justices, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 30, 2007, at C19 (arguing that in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Catholic
Supreme Court Justices may have ignored the separation of church and state, and
"'mandate[d] [their] own moral code' "); Robin Toner, Subtext of Abortion Ruling:
Religion; Catholics Dominate Supreme Court, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Apr. 26,
2007, at 4 (noting the debate concerning the Supreme Court's Catholic majority
following the Court's decision in Gonzales v. Carhart); Frances
Kissling, Why I Won't Stay Silent Anymore, SALON.COM, May 11, 2007,
http://www.salon.com/opinion/featurel2007/05/11/kissling (arguing that the majority
in Gonzales v. Carhart "cannot distinguish the Constitution from the catechism of
the Catholic Church").
6 The majority in Gonzales consisted of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1618. For my
evaluation of Gonzales v. Carhart, see Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and
Abortion: The Implications of Gonzales v. Carhart, in LIFE AND LEARNING XVII: THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE
(Joseph W. Koterski ed., forthcoming 2008).
7 See Myers, The United States Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 225.
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religion.8 The title of Stephen Carter's 1993 book-The Culture
of Disbelief How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious
Devotion-captures this evaluation of the Court's work product.
In that book, Professor Carter wrote about how American law
treats religion as a hobby-like building model airplanes. In this
view, religion is "something quiet, something private, something
trivial-and not really a fit activity for intelligent, public-spirited
adults."9 In the mid-1980s, Gerry Bradley had noted: "The Court
is now clearly committed to articulating and enforcing a
normative scheme of 'private' religion." 10
Under this view, privatization meant that religion had to be
treated as a private affair that should not play a role in public
life. I have in mind here a broad understanding of "religion"; I
mean religious institutions, religious individuals, and religiously-
influenced moral principles. Many of the cases arise under the
Establishment Clause,'1 but it is important not to limit the
discussion to religion clause cases. Many of the cases that more
clearly reveal the Justices' understanding of the relationship
between religion and the legal order arise in the area of public
morality (abortion, assisted suicide, etc.), which are decided
under different doctrinal labels (substantive due process and
equal protection, for example).
In both contexts (cases involving the Establishment Clause
and cases involving public morality issues)
religion is typically involved in an explicitly public role. For
example, many Establishment Clause issues involve aid to
religious institutions. The constitutional debate in these cases
often turns on whether it is permissible for the religious
institution to play an active role in performing a "public" task,
8 See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1975) (invalidating a state law
providing educational equipment and materials to nonpublic schools as "an
impermissible establishment of religion"), overruled in part by Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 828 (1973); Comm. for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779-80 (1973) (rendering the same
holding as in Sloan v. Lemon that state laws providing reimbursement to parents
whose children attended nonpublic schools were unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause, since the laws had "the effect of advancing religious
institutions").
9 CARTER, supra note 1, at 22.
10 Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy: A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion
Clause Cases, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 275, 276-77 (1986).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion ... ").
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such as education or child care. The privatization thesis
requires that institutions retaining their religious character be
denied direct government support.12
These schools must be tolerated, and I mean toleration in the
sense of a grudging concession to a practice of which one
disapproves. But these schools cannot be regarded as equal
players in the public task of education. In cases involving
constitutional challenges to laws promoting public morality (laws
banning abortion and homosexual conduct, for example), the
courts have frequently considered
the appropriate role of religiously influenced moral principles in
public decision-making.... Here, the privatization thesis
works in two ways. First, religiously influenced moral
judgments are not taken into account in support of the
constitutionality of legislation because such judgments do not
constitute "secular" interests that the government may advance.
Second, religiously influenced moral judgments are viewed as
dispositive of the case against the constitutionality of legislation
because it [supposedly] violates the Establishment Clause for
"religious" views to be embodied in secular legislation." 13
As late as the early 1980s, the Court seemed to be moving
strongly in this direction. 14 I do think, and I have explored this
topic in some detail in several articles, 15 that in general the law
has improved in this area. The Court no longer seems to place
religion under special disabilities-which was true under the
Court's cases dealing with aid to religious institutions through
about 1985. The Court's approach-and this is most-readily seen
in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris6 -is that there is no
12 Myers, Privatization of Religion, supra note 1, at 22-23.
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (holding that city
programs that sent public school teachers into religious schools to provide
instruction and guidance services were an unconstitutional advancement of
religion), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997); Sch. Dist. v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (holding that programs that provided classes to nonpublic
school students at public expense in classrooms located in and leased from the local
nonpublic schools had the effect of advancing religion and therefore violated the
Establishment Clause), overruled by Agostini, 521 U.S. at 236.
15 See Richard S. Myers, A Comment on the Death of Lemon, 43 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 903, 904, 907-08 (1993) [hereinafter Myers, A Comment]; Myers, Privatization
of Religion, supra note 1, at 29; Myers, The Ten Commandments Cases, supra note 1,
at 250-53; Myers, The United States Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 223.
16 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (finding no violation of the Establishment Clause by the
Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program's voucher system because the program itself was
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Establishment Clause violation if religion is treated on equal
terms. Unfortunately, this neutrality is not required by the
Constitution-equal treatment seems to be largely a matter of
legislative grace, as the 2004 decision in Locke v. Davey
demonstrated.17 There, a 7-2 majority (only Justices Scalia and
Thomas dissented) had no problem permitting the State of
Washington to discriminate against religion.18
In general, though, the Court no longer expresses the
negative views of religion that characterized the earlier cases.
The Court seems willing to allow religion an equal role in the
political process, and that improvement is worthy of note. We
have moved from hostility towards a public role for religion to
neutrality.
Unfortunately, this situation is highly unstable. Some
decisions, such as the 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 19 seem
to condemn the state's reliance on religiously informed moral
norms, a development that seemed a thing of the past at the time
of the Court's assisted suicide cases in 1997.20 In the
Establishment Clause context, some recent opinions have revived
the divisiveness doctrine.
This latter point is worthy of more extensive treatment. At
one point, the Court (in the 1970s and early 1980s) expressed
concern that political divisiveness that might be engendered by
religious involvement in the political process was a warning
signal of Establishment Clause problems. 21 By 1990 or so
[t]he Court seem[ed] to have rejected the view that political
division along religious lines is an evil, reasoning that such
divisiveness is a normal part of the political process and not a
neutral toward religion and any government aid that reached religious schools
resulted from recipients' private choice).
17 540 U.S. 712, 723-25 (2004) (holding that Washington State did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause by forbidding recipients of its Promise Scholarship
Program to apply the funding to a devotional theology degree).
18 See id. at 720-21.
19 539 U.S. 558 (2003). For commentary on Lawrence, see Richard S. Myers,
Pope John Paul II, Freedom, and Constitutional Law, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008).
20 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-11 (1997).
21 See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
797-98 (1973) ("And while the prospect of such divisiveness may not alone warrant
the invalidation of state laws that otherwise survive the careful scrutiny required by
the decisions of this Court, it is certainly a 'warning signal' not to be ignored [that
the Establishment Clause is in jeopardy].").
2008]
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cause for concern. The Court's more recent cases[, I said some
years ago,] reflect an increasing receptivity to religious activism
in politics. 2
2
In McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky23 and in some of the opinions in Van Orden v. Perry,24
in contrast, there are constant references to concerns about
divisiveness. Justice Souter, for example, noted with great alarm
that "the divisiveness of religion in current public life is
inescapable. This is no time to deny the prudence of
understanding the Establishment Clause to require the
Government to stay neutral on religious belief, which is reserved
for the conscience of the individual."25 The solution, for Justice
Souter, is privatization. This reemergence of a focus on
divisiveness is, therefore, a cause for concern.
My most serious reservation about the Court's
Establishment Clause opinions is that a majority of the Court
still seems far removed from being able to acknowledge a special
role for religion. Whether our liberties can be thought secure
without this recognition is still an open question.26 The Court is
still worlds away from the view expressed in Dignitatis Humanae
that "[g]overnment.. . ought indeed to take account of the
religious life of the citizenry and show it favor, since the function
of government is to make provision for the common welfare."27
I think, in sum, that the legal doctrine has improved quite a
bit in recent decades. The extremes of the Court's Establishment
Clause cases from the 1970s and the early 1980s have been
softened considerably, although the recent concerns about
divisiveness from certain Justices on the Court ought to give one
pause. In the area of public morality, a majority of the Court has
never clearly held that the government may not rely on
religiously influenced moral values, although again recent
opinions such as Lawrence ought to give one pause.
My major concern is that the theme of privatizing religion
still seems to have great resonance among prominent legal
scholars, as well as in the culture at large. For example, in an
22 Myers, The United States Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 223.
23 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
24 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
25 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 881.
26 Myers, The United States Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 223-24, 231-34.
27 PAUL VI, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM DIGNITATIS HUMANAE 13
(Dec. 7, 1965).
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article in the Michigan Law Review a few years ago, Chris
Whitman exclaimed at some length about how the legal and
moral controversy over abortion could not usefully be addressed
by focusing on an issue such as when life begins because that
question is a "religious" one about which the government cannot
take sides.28  Michael Gerhardt's article, Why the Catholic
Majority on the Supreme Court May Be Unconstitutional, is
difficult to summarize, but one of its principal concerns is about
the "religious convictions" of the Catholics on the Supreme Court
as they relate to the great issues of the day, in particular the
issue of abortion.29 In contrast, the views of Justices such as
Breyer and Ginsburg on abortion are merely ideological
commitments that raise no similar concern.
Perhaps the most-noteworthy example of this phenomenon
(the support for the privatization of religion from prominent
academics) was in some of the reaction to Gonzales v. Carhart
and, in particular, the reaction that noted with alarm that all
five Justices in the majority are Catholic.
Some of this commentary was from people such as Frances
Kissling who predictably complained that, "the decision injected
orthodox Catholic teaching into the interpretation of
constitutional rights."30 But it was more telling in my view to see
the same basic point made by Geoffrey Stone, one of the most
prominent professors of constitutional law in the country. Stone
complained that the five Catholic Justices "failed to respect the
fundamental difference between religious belief and morality"
and threatened the separation of church and state.31 Stone was
appropriately taken to task by many. Writing in the Wall Street
Journal, John Yoo stated that
[p]laying the religion card is worse than silly because it shows
how intellectually lazy the liberal defense of Roe has
become.... Rather than develop reasoned responses to the
court or the arguments of conservatives, liberal critics resort to
the mystical for easy answers. They suggest that irrational
28 Chris Whitman, Looking Back on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1980, 1993-96 (2002). For a critical comment on Professor Whitman's article,
see Richard S. Myers, Reflections on "Looking Back on Planned Parenthood v.
Casey," in LIFE AND LEARNING XIII: THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH
UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE 3-19 (Joseph W. Koterski ed., 2004).
29 See Gerhardt, supra note 4, at 183-89.
30 Kissling, supra note 5.
31 Stone, supra note 5.
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religious faith or pure Catholic doctrine handed down from the
Vatican drives the Justices. It is much easier to dismiss your
opponents as driven by mysterious forces than to do the hard
work of developing arguments built on human reason. This
religious critique recalls the nativist fear of Catholicism that too
often appears in U.S. history. 32
I think the responses to Professor Stone were devastating.
But his commentary reflects a widespread notion in the culture
(the idea of the privatization of religion) that it is important to
resist. Fortunately, there is not much legal support for Stone's
argument, although my conclusion is a tentative because of cases
such as Lawrence v. Texas.33 Stone's argument depends (as do
the arguments of Whitman and Gerhardt) on the idea that
legislation must be supported by a certain form of secular
rationality. Fortunately, a majority of the Supreme Court has
rejected this position:
The Court continually reaffirms the idea that a moral position
should not be regarded as religious [and therefore illegitimate]
simply because it happens to coincide with the tenets of some
religious organizations .... The Court has consistently refused
to restrict the types of moral arguments that are considered a
legitimate part of public debate.... The Court has not insisted
that laws be supported by a certain form of secular
reasoning.... The Court has adopted a wide understanding
that permits the inclusion of a range of comprehensive moral
views, even if some might regard one or more of these
comprehensive moral views as religious in some sense.34
The conclusion from an article by Professor (now Judge)
Michael McConnell provides an apt summary:
One false view of separation is the view that religious ideas
must not serve as rationales for public policy. This view, called
the "principle of secular rationale," is put forward as a means of
protecting the public sphere from divisive, absolutist, intolerant
impulses and from arguments that cannot be supported on the
basis of accessible public reasons. But in fact, it rests on
inaccurate stereotypes and questionable epistemological
premises, and it would disenfranchise religious persons as full
participating members of the political community. The United
States has never adhered to the principle of secular rationale.
32 John Yoo, Partial-Birth Bigotry, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2007, at A8.
33 See Myers, supra note 19.
34 Myers, supra note 6, at 13.
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Indeed, our political history is rife with religious political
activists and religious political arguments.... [T]here is no
good democratic argument for excluding them. But more than
this: to exclude them would be inconsistent with the very ideals
of democratic equality that the principle of secular rationale
ostensibly seeks to protect. It is time to stop challenging our
fellow citizens' right to be part of democratic dialogue, and time
to engage their arguments on the merits. 35
I think, as I have noted above, that the legal doctrine with
regard to privatizing religion is now acceptable. Certainly,
efforts to preserve this legal situation must be made. But
perhaps more important in the long run is an effort to respond to
the broader cultural pressures in favor of privatization. It is
important for religion (broadly understood) to shape the culture.
Religious institutions and individuals certainly ought to have an
equal place at the table. Religiously informed moral arguments
ought to as well. If they do not, then our culture and our law will
ultimately lose any sense of God and of a transcendent order.36
This sense is critical to the protection of human rights. As then-
Cardinal Ratzinger stated: "The ultimate root... of all attacks
on human life, is the loss of [a belief in] God [and in a
transcendent order]. Where ... [this belief] disappears, the
absolute dignity of human life disappears as well."3 7
Maybe, ironically, the Court's decision in Gonzales v.
Carhart, which has elicited so much outcry, may suggest some
possibilities. In its more controversial passages, the opinion
focused on the impact of abortion on women.38 Perhaps the work
that religious groups have long done to deal with this problem (I
am thinking of such work as Project Rachel) 39 and the work of
crisis pregnancy centers (which are often sponsored by religious
35 Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim That Religious
Arguments Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV.
639, 656-57.
36 See Myers, A Comment, supra note 15, at 909; Myers, The Ten
Commandments Cases, supra note 1, at 252.
37 JOSEPH RATZINGER, CONSISTORY OF CARDINALS ON THREATS TO HUMAN LIFE,
THE PROBLEM OF THREATS TO HUMAN LIFE: 43 (1991), http://www.priestsforlife.
org/magisteriumlthreatstohumanlife.htm.
38 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007). For a more general
discussion of Gonzales v. Carhart, see Myers, supra note 6.
39 Project Rachel is a program sponsored by the Catholic Church that provides
free services such as counseling to all persons negatively affected by abortion. See
There Is Hope After Abortion, http://www.hopeafterabortion.com (last visited Feb. 2,
2008), for more information.
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groups and which have been so prominent in the news of late)
may help in this regard. This positive example of faith in action
may help to rebuild the culture of life and may help to counter
the idea of the privatization of religion.
